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5fb83af3e3
Policy: add ingress channel conformance checks (#85744)
Merged via squash.
Prepared head SHA: bd63c8d153
Co-authored-by: giodl73-repo <235387111+giodl73-repo@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @giodl73-repo
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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summary: "Adds policy-backed doctor checks for workspace conformance."
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read_when:
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- You are installing, configuring, or auditing the policy plugin
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title: "Policy plugin"
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---
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# Policy plugin
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Adds policy-backed doctor checks for workspace conformance.
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## Distribution
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- Package: `@openclaw/policy`
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- Install route: included in OpenClaw
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## Surface
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plugin
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## Behavior
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The Policy plugin contributes doctor health checks for policy-managed OpenClaw
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settings and governed workspace declarations. Policy currently covers channel
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conformance, governed tool metadata, MCP server posture, model-provider posture,
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private-network access posture, Gateway exposure posture, agent workspace/tool
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posture, configured global/per-agent tool posture, configured sandbox runtime
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posture, ingress/channel access posture, and OpenClaw config secret
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provider/auth profile posture.
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Policy stores authored requirements in `policy.jsonc`, observes existing
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OpenClaw settings and workspace declarations as evidence, and reports drift
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through `openclaw policy check` and `openclaw doctor --lint`. A clean policy
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check emits policy, evidence, findings, and attestation hashes that operators
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can record for audit.
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Tool posture rules can require approved profiles, workspace-only filesystem
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tools, bounded exec security/ask/host settings, disabled elevated mode, exact
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`alsoAllow` entries, and required tool deny entries. The evidence records
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additive `alsoAllow` entries because they can widen effective tool posture.
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These checks observe config conformance only; they do not read runtime approval
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state or add runtime enforcement.
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Sandbox posture rules can require approved sandbox modes/backends, deny host
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container networking, deny container namespace joins, require read-only container
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mounts, deny container runtime socket mounts and unconfined container profiles,
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and require sandbox browser CDP source ranges.
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These checks observe config conformance only; they do not read runtime approval
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state, inspect live containers, or add runtime enforcement.
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Named policy scopes under `scopes.<scopeName>` can add stricter normal policy
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sections for the selector they list. `agentIds` supports `tools`,
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`agents.workspace`, and `sandbox`; `channelIds` supports `ingress.channels`.
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Runtime agent ids that are not explicitly listed in `agents.list[]` are checked
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against inherited global/default posture rather than silently passing with no
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evidence. Every scope present in `policy.jsonc` must be valid and enforceable
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for its selector. Overlay rules are additional claims, so they do not weaken
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top-level policy and can produce their own findings when the same observed
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config violates both scopes.
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## Related docs
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- [policy](/cli/policy)
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